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THE NONPROBLEM OF FUNDAMENTALISM
Andrew Koppelman*
I am not sure I should be here.  When I was invited to this conference on
“Families, Fundamentalism, & the First Amendment,” my reaction was that, although
there are real issues worth discussing, this is the wrong way to identify them.  I still
think so.
The announcement of this conference declares: “Fundamentalist families compel
the state to confront a classic political challenge in which it must balance its commit-
ment to noninterference in private lives against its commitment to securing individuals’
entitlements to certain basic liberties, even when threats to those liberties come from
within the family itself.”1  Fundamentalist families, then, are understood to constitute
a threat to basic liberties.
This is a big mistake.  Unless you are invested in a modernist biblical hermeneutic,
fundamentalism as such is not a problem.
Fundamentalism, without more, entails nothing in particular about basic liberties. 
It is a strategy of biblical interpretation, contingently and historically linked to a kind
of anti-modernism.  Its contingency means that its agenda will sometimes coincide
with that of modernist liberals.  There is no problem of fundamentalism as such. 
There is a cluster of problems, with which some fundamentalists tend to be associated. 
The value of fundamentalism is something that needs to be determined at retail, case
by case.
I. THE NONPROBLEM OF FUNDAMENTALISM
Defining fundamentalism is tricky.  George Marsden observes that “fundamen-
talism,” in its original 1920s form, refers to “a broad coalition of conservatives from
major denominations and revivalists (prominently including premillennial dispensa-
tionalists) who are militantly opposed to modernism in the churches and to certain
modern cultural mores.”2  More specifically, it refers to a movement that avows a
literal interpretation of the Bible.3  In more modern usage, it refers to the evangelical
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1 Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Families, Fundamentalism, & the First Amendment,
http://law.wm.edu/academics/intellectuallife/researchcenters/ibrl/programsandevents/index
.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
2 GEORGE M. MARSDEN, FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE 234 (2d ed. 2006).
3 See generally id. “From its origins fundamentalism was . . . a movement among
American ‘evangelical’ Christians, people professing complete confidence in the Bible
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Protestant wing of the Religious Right, a coalition that also includes Catholics and
Mormons.4  The agenda of the Religious Right is, of course, associated with conser-
vative positions on abortion, gay rights, funding for the arts, child care policy, the
roles of the sexes, and the place of traditional values in education and especially in
sex education.5
With respect to each of these issues, fundamentalism is essentially a reaction
against what James Davison Hunter has called a “progressive” worldview, which
tends to take human well-being as the ultimate standard by which moral judgments
and policy decisions are grounded, and to treat any moral truth as a human construction
that is always subject to reevaluation in light of experience.6  Perhaps because of its
oppositional character in modern circumstances, Marsden is able to suggest a short-
hand definition: a fundamentalist is “an evangelical who is angry about something.”7 
The bounds of the category, in short, are somewhat vague.  For my purposes, I will use
it to refer to the set of people who self-identify this way.  As thus defined, it describes
a lot of people.
The illiberalism of American fundamentalists should not be exaggerated.  Marsden
notes some salient differences between American fundamentalists and radical Islamists,
to whom the label “fundamentalist” is also often applied.8  Both are trying to stop
the “‘erosion of religious identity . . . and create viable alternatives to secular insti-
tutions.’”9  But American fundamentalists’ warfare “is almost always metaphorical
rather than literal.”10  They hardly ever engage in violence, they affirm separation
of church and state, they are strong believers in individual liberty, and they remain
comfortable with the liberal ideals of the American Revolution.11
and . . . convinced that sincere acceptance of this ‘Gospel’ message was the key to virtue in
this life and to eternal life in heaven . . . .” Id. at 3.
4 Id. at 234–35.
5 See id. at 240–43; see also JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE
TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
6 See HUNTER, supra note 5, at 43–48 (discussing the “culture war” between orthodox
and progressive worldviews).
7 MARSDEN, supra note 2, at 235.
8 Id. at 250 (“[S]cholars often extended the use of the term ‘fundamentalist’ to include
militant anti-modernists of other world religions, especially Islam.”).
9 Id. (quoting GABRIEL A. ALMOND ET AL., STRONG RELIGION: THE RISE OF FUNDA-
MENTALISMS AROUND THE WORLD 17 (2003)).
10 Id.
11 This is evident even in some of the most extreme fundamentalists, such as David Smolin,
who argues that Christians should be permitted to legislate on the basis of religious dogma—by
outlawing abortion, fornication, and homosexual conduct, for example—but that the basic
religious and political rights of non-Christians will continue to be respected.
The vast majority of American traditionalist theists embrace America’s
heritage of civil and political liberty. . . . They believe that government
should not coerce religious belief, nor generally interfere with religious
liberty, regardless of whether that religion be their own or another’s.
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In some respects, fundamentalists can even be enlisted as friends of liberalism. 
Their first champion, William Jennings Bryan, was an early proponent of women’s
suffrage, railroad regulation, the federal income tax, opposition to capital punishment,
a federal department of labor, campaign fund disclosure, state initiative and referendum,
and vigorous enforcement of antitrust law.12  His campaigns, Garry Wills observes,
were “the most leftist mounted by a major party’s candidate in our entire history.”13 
Bryan’s fundamentalist politics culminated in the New Deal, and its traces can still
be found in the Democratic Party.14
It is true that fundamentalism can contingently be malign in some circumstances,
and this in two ways.  Most notoriously today, it can support a retrograde politics, one
that would have astonished Bryan.  One can imagine what he would have thought
of the efforts of Reagan or the two Bushes, all of whom looked to fundamentalists
as a crucial part of their political base, to make the tax code more regressive, to
weaken workplace safety regulations, or to subject old age pensions to the vagaries
of the stock market.
More pertinently here, fundamentalism can license certain varieties of child abuse,
most importantly efforts by parents to prevent their children from being adequately
educated.  The problem is most acute with respect to homeschooling, where, as James
Dwyer and my colleague Kim Yuracko have documented, many states have com-
pletely abdicated their oversight responsibilities; some children are getting wretched
educations in “homeschooling” that does not deserve the name.15
But here the use of “fundamentalism” as a category of analysis is even more
misguided than it is in the study of politics.  Fundamentalist religion is, at least, a
fairly reliable predictor of political behavior.16  The education problem in particular
is contingent, and not unique to or especially related to fundamentalism.  The over-
whelming majority of fundamentalists cheerfully send their children to public
Most American theists perceive these constitutional protections as con-
gruent with their faith, insofar as they safeguard the legitimacy of law
and the limitations of governmental power. They believe that America
is under God and that America should be a Christian nation, while main-
taining that Christianity is compatible with freedom.
David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A
Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1098 (1991) (book review).
12 GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 99 (1990).
13 Id.
14 See Susan D. Franck, Foreword: A Symposium Exploring the Modern Legacy of William
Jennings Bryan, 86 NEB. L. REV. 142, 142 & n.5 (2007).
15 James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare
and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74
N.C. L. REV. 1321 (1996); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional
Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123 (2008).
16 See generally GEOFFREY C. LAYMAN, THE GREAT DIVIDE: RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL
CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS (2001).
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schools.17  Fundamentalists have become an increasingly large proportion of home-
schoolers,18 but that fact has no significance in itself.  Some homeschooling is ex-
tremely good, and there is no reliable data about the proportion of good and bad.19 
The bad homeschoolers are not all fundamentalists.20
In short, if you are concerned about child welfare, it is a mistake to use funda-
mentalism as a category of inquiry.
Deeming fundamentalism the problem in this context is also a strategic error in
rhetoric—exactly the same kind of error that was committed by those who claimed,
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, that Islam was the problem.  This way
of putting things slandered millions of potential allies.
Public secularism takes different forms in different regimes.  France and Turkey,
for example, aggressively strive to purge the public sphere of any trace of religion.21 
The United States is not like that.  We have not had a strong anticlerical party.22  The
salient difference, Ahmet Kuru observes, is that in America, there was no danger that
an old local monarchy would reestablish itself on a religious basis.23  Secular rationalists
therefore did not, for the most part, become anticlerical or antireligious.  Rather, they
worked together toward a regime of religious liberty acceptable to both.24  What was
true then is true now.  America does not need an anticlerical party.
Religion has been ubiquitous in American public life.25  It is hardly obvious that
this is a bad thing.  The most important religiously-based movement in American
politics was abolitionism.26  There were few secular arguments for getting rid of
slavery, and practical men of affairs had little interest in such arguments as there were. 
The civil rights movement of the 1960s, too, had religious roots.27  And then there
is Bryan.
The recent proliferation of works of political philosophy fretting about the role
of religion in politics28 is also a consequence of a recent phenomenon, the alignment
17 Nomi May Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out”: Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 638–39
(1993).
18 Yuracko, supra note 15, at 126–27, 127 n.17.
19 Id. at 134–35.
20 Id. at 135 n.51.
21 See AHMET T. KURU, SECULARISM AND STATE POLICIES TOWARD RELIGION: THE UNITED
STATES, FRANCE, AND TURKEY 8–9 (2009).
22 See generally id. at 6–100.
23 Id. at 23, 25–30.
24 Id. at 28–29.
25 See generally A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1985).
26 See generally id. at 191–93.
27 See id. at 241–42.
28 The literature on this topic is extensive. See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMIT-
MENT AND SECULAR REASON (2000); ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION
IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE
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of the most religious Americans with the political right.  This alignment only began
in the late 1970s.29  Before then, religion was a politically cross-cutting category, with
religious groups swinging left on the most pressing issues: the civil rights movement
and the Vietnam War.30
The contingency of the connection between religion and the political right was
made clear by the emergence in the 2008 Republican presidential primaries of Mike
Huckabee, who is as religious as they come, but who is surprisingly leftish with re-
spect to a range of economic issues.31  We may already be seeing the breakup of the
Religious Right as a coherent political movement.32  But that hardly means the end
of fundamentalism.
II. A CASE STUDY: THE EX-GAY MOVEMENT
The instabilities within fundamentalism—and the opportunities these create—are
especially apparent in the rhetorical and political dynamics of the ex-gay movement. 
Gay rights issues raise both of the concerns about fundamentalism I mentioned earlier:
fundamentalists have supported repressive politics, and they raise their gay children
in ways that are likely to produce guilt and self-loathing.  Neither of these can be
stopped.  Fundamentalists have the right to vote, and they cannot be prevented from
teaching their children what they believe.  Yet the consequences of this acculturation
are in some ways surprising.
(1997); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2002); KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND
PUBLIC REASONS (1995); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997); MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD?:
RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2003); RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY
LIBERALISM (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997); PAUL J. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND THE OBLI-
GATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (2002); Smolin, supra note 11; Symposium, Religiously Based
Morality: Its Proper Place in American Law and Public Policy?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
217 (2001); Symposium, The Role of Religion in Public Debate in a Liberal Society, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 643 (1993); Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square,
105 HARV. L. REV. 2061 (1992) (book review).
29 See ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 191–214 (1988).
30 See id. at 145–48. My own view is that religious people have as much right to participate
in politics as anyone else, but that the courts appropriately monitor the output of their partici-
pation to ensure that it has a secular legislative purpose. See Andrew Koppelman, Secular
Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002).
31 This is emphatically not an endorsement of Huckabee. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Shake,
Rattle and Roil the Grand Ol’ Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at 1.
32 See David D. Kirkpatrick, The Evangelical Crackup, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 28, 2007,
at 38.
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The October 2007 issue of Christianity Today included a fascinating piece about
the evolution of the ex-gay movement.33  The article inadvertently exposes a major
fault line in the Christian Right’s position on homosexuality.
The article, unsurprisingly given its venue, takes as an unquestioned premise that
homosexual desire and homosexual conduct are always evils to be avoided.  It notes
an important shift in the claims being made by the ex-gay movement, a primarily
Christian movement that has been around for some decades now, promising to lead
gay people away from homosexuality.34  In the early days of the movement, it claimed
that a gay person could transform him- or herself into a heterosexual through a pure
act of will.35  Those claims have now disappeared.  The article reports that “[e]arly
hopes for instant healing have given way to belief that transformation occurs through
a lifetime of discipleship.”36
Alan Chambers, president of Exodus International, the largest of the ex-gay
groups,37
is frank that change does not eradicate temptation.  He wonders
if change is ever 100 percent complete in this life.  “One thing
we can expect as Christians is a life of denial,” he says.  “I don’t
think we’re afraid to tell people that they may have a lifetime of
struggle.  Freedom isn’t the absence of struggle, but the life of
struggle with joy in the process.”
The ex-gay movement seeks to integrate the reality of same-
sex attraction into a life of discipleship.  In that lifelong journey,
they expect many changes, including changes of feeling and
attraction.  But they emphasize that each person’s experience is
different, and that instant transformation is extremely rare.
Not surprisingly then, ex-gay ministries appeal almost ex-
clusively to Christians. Most participants come from evangelical
backgrounds and can’t resolve their Christian faith with a gay
identity.38
An accompanying article describes a recent study of “reparative therapy” (therapy
that seeks to transform sexual orientation).39  The study struggles to cast that therapy
in the best possible light.  But among those who were deemed to have successfully
converted to heterosexual, most
33 Tim Stafford, An Older, Wiser Ex-Gay Movement, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct. 2007,
at 49.
34 See id. at 50–51.
35 See id. at 50.
36 Id.
37 See id.
38 Id. at 51.
39 Tim Stafford, The Best Research Yet, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct. 2007, at 52.
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“did not report themselves to be without experience of homosexual
arousal, and did not report heterosexual orientation to be unequiv-
ocal and uncomplicated.  Sexual orientation for the individuals
in this study (and indeed for most of us) may be considerably
more complicated than commonly conceived, involving a com-
plex interplay of what we are instinctively attracted to, what we
can be attracted to with proper attention and focus, what we choose
to be attracted to based on how we structure our interpersonal envi-
ronments, our emotional attachments, our broader psychological
functioning, (of course) our religious and moral beliefs and values,
and many more factors.  We believe the individuals who presented
themselves as heterosexual success stories at Time 3 are hetero-
sexual in some meaningful but complicated sense of the term.”40
The abandonment of the claim that sexual orientation can easily be changed is
very big news.  Poll data reveals that those who think homosexuality is innate are
overwhelmingly likely to support gay rights, while those who think homosexuality
is a choice are likely to be opposed.41  “Of those who consider it a choice,” a New
York Times poll reported in 1993, “only 18 percent rated it as acceptable, compared
with 57 percent of those who regard it as something gay men and lesbians cannot
change.”42
There is nothing illogical about thinking that homosexuality is innate and none-
theless opposing gay rights.  One can regard it as an unfortunate fact of life that
some people are permanently denied any permissible path to sexual happiness.  The
Christianity Today article ends on that note: “Our attractions, always disordered to
some extent, must be submitted to Christ, who alone can redeem us. For those who
feel strong same-sex attractions, that task is especially difficult. But it is the same
basic struggle every Christian must face.”43
But that story is a hard sell.  Americans like happy endings.  They like to think
that if homosexual sex is forbidden, then another avenue to sexual fulfillment is easily
available to gay people.  That is why the leadership of the Christian Right has tended
to be quiet about the ambiguities in the experience of those in the ex-gay movement. 
As recent studies of the ex-gay movement have shown, this has produced considerable
40 See id. at 54.
41 See Jeffrey Schmalz, Poll Finds an Even Split on Homosexuality’s Cause, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 1993, at A14 (reporting results of a New York Times/CBS poll).
42 Id. The same correlation has been found in dozens of surveys over several decades:
“regarding a homosexual orientation as freely chosen has consistently been associated with
more negative attitudes toward gay people and opposition to gay rights.” Gregory M. Herek,
Gender Gaps in Public Opinion about Lesbians and Gay Men, 66 PUB. OPINION. Q. 40, 46
(2002).
43 Stafford, supra note 33, at 51.
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tensions.44  One committed member of the movement denounced the hypocrisy of
his fellow Christians:
“Most of them can’t handle the truth.  If you’re in the church and
you’re a drug addict, murderer, whatever, guys will come up to
you and slap you on the ass.  You’re one of the guys.  But if you
state you struggle with homosexuality, you get the whole pew to
yourself.”45
The appearance of the Christianity Today article is a significant event because
it shows that mainstream conservative Christianity is now willing to admit these
uncomfortable facts.  This, however, is a decidedly unstable cultural formation.  It
is also liable to slippage, as when Michael Bussee, one of the founders of Exodus
International, fell in love with one of the members.46  They left the group together
and never came back.47
The ex-gay movement is, wittingly or not, a progressive force in American
politics.  It demands that the immutability claim be taken seriously, and its members
are not easily dismissed by the Religious Right, because they agree with the Religious
Right about nearly everything else.48  They have a credibility and a competence in the
pertinent theological claims that no one else can possibly match.  They are able to
speak to their own cultural group in the same way that sophisticated Islamic feminist
theologians can speak to theirs.49
Among Americans, there is a sharp generational divide on gay rights and same-
sex marriage.  According to Gallup, 57 percent oppose same-sex marriage.50  But,
according to another poll, among those 18 to 34 years old, 58 percent support same-
sex marriages.51  The number falls to 42 percent among respondents aged 35 to 49,
to 41 percent of those aged 50 to 64, and to 24 percent of Americans 65 and older.52
44 See MICHELLE WOLKOMIR, “BE NOT DECEIVED”: THE SACRED AND SEXUAL STRUGGLES
OF GAY AND EX-GAY CHRISTIAN MEN (2006); see also TANYA ERZEN, STRAIGHT TO JESUS:
SEXUAL AND CHRISTIAN CONVERSIONS IN THE EX-GAY MOVEMENT (2006).
45 ERZEN, supra note 44, at 66.
46 See WOLKOMIR, supra note 44, at 28–29.
47 See id. at 29–30.
48 See ERZEN, supra note 44, at 186–88 (explaining the relationship between the ex-gay
movement and the Christian Right).
49 See, e.g., Asra Q. Nomani, A Gender Jihad For Islam’s Future, WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
2005, at B2.
50 Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority of Americans Continue to Oppose Gay Marriage, GALLUP,
May 27, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/118378/Majority-Americans-Continue-Oppose
-Gay-Marriage.aspx.
51 Paul Steinhauser, CNN Poll: Generations Disagree on Same-Sex Marriage, CNN.COM,
May 4, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/05/04/samesex.marriage.poll/.
52 Id. Other polls reach similar results. See Arian Campo-Flores, A Gay Marriage Surge,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 5, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/172399 (finding “about half of those
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The same effect is noticeable among white evangelical Christians, otherwise a
very conservative lot: 58 percent of those 18–29 years old support some legal recog-
nition of same-sex couples, with 26 percent supporting marriage rights.53  Only 46
percent of those over 30 support any legal recognition, with 9 percent supporting
marriage.54  Older evangelicals also care much more about the issue: according to
a Pew Forum study, 61.8 percent of those over 60 said that “stopping gay marriage”
was very important, while only 34 percent of those 29 and under said so.55
I predict that in twenty years, there will still be millions of fundamentalists;
politically conservative, deeply opposed to abortion, and skeptical of Darwin.  But
they will not care at all about gay rights issues.  That will make life easier for young
fundamentalists who discover that they are attracted to persons of the same sex. 
Fundamentalism is anti-modernism, but the definition of the modernity that is being
resisted is fluid and subject to continuing negotiation.
CONCLUSION
I am not a fundamentalist myself.  I am a secular liberal.  Secular liberals are,
of course, no more happy with the present state of American society than fundamen-
talists are, though the sources of our unhappiness are somewhat different.  The emerg-
ing plutocracy is unlikely to be an enduring source of joy to either.  There are areas
of overlap, though, and neither group is large enough to accomplish what it wants
without help.
Most fundamentalists would not be pleased by the horror stories of non-education
that are told by Dwyer and Yuracko.56  With respect to other educational issues, such
as natural history, sex education, or the meaning of gender, there is likely to be deeper
disagreement.  We have important issues to argue about.  But the question of the
appropriate biblical hermeneutic is not among them.
aged 18 to 34 back [same-sex] marriage rights”); Jones, supra note 50 (finding 59 percent
of 18–29 year-olds support same-sex marriage); Adam Nagourney, Signs G.O.P. Is Rethinking
Stance on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at A4 (finding 57 percent of those under
40 support same-sex marriage).
53 GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH, INC., YOUNG EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS
AND THE 2008 ELECTION, Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.greenbergresearch.com/index.php?ID
=2251.
54 Id.
55 Steven Waldman, Beliefnet, Abortion vs. Homosexuality: The Evangelical Age Gap,
http://blog.beliefnet.com/stevenwaldman/2008/07/abortion-vs-homosexuality-the.html
(July 8, 2008, 15:17 EST) (also citing similar data from Barna Research).
56 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
